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III. Military Situation of Tito regime.

A. Military Situation in Yugoslavia.

1. Strength and Disposition. The Yugoslav Army has an estimated strength of 250,000; 50,000 to 60,000 are believed to be regular officers or regular non-commissioned officers and the remaining 190,000 to 200,000 are conscripts. The Army is organized into 4 Military Districts, 6 Armies, 31 infantry divisions, 2 armored divisions, and 34 independent regiments.

2. The military leadership of the Yugoslav Army, is well prepared for defensive fighting in Yugoslavia. Most of the leaders saw active service of some nature during World War II. Many of the senior Yugoslav officers fought in the Spanish Civil War. Large numbers of Yugoslav Army officers were trained by the Soviets inside the U.S.S.R. prior to the Tito defection. Furthermore, a military mission of about 5,000 Soviet officers spent nearly 3 years in Yugoslavia training the Yugoslav Armed Forces. The capabilities of the individual Yugoslav officer can be expected to be at least equal to, or better than, that of his Satellite counterpart.

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3. The Yugoslav Army, by reason of experience in warfare and the intensity and scope of its training since 1945, is considered to be well-trained for defensive fighting. Maneuvers have reached army-group level during the last two years.

4. The Yugoslav Army, which is much better equipped than the armies of Albania, Hungary, and Rumania, is believed to be about equal with the Bulgarian Army on the basis of unit comparison. However, since the 1948 defection of Tito, Yugoslavia has had no outside source of supply for military matériel. Also, her own production capabilities are limited. The unfavorable supply situation is aggravated by the fact that the Yugoslav forces are, equipped to a considerable extent, with Soviet-type matériel. The conversion of some units to German small arms, as a step-up of production of component parts and ammunition, and a stockpile of unknown size of German and Soviet weapons and ammunition, ameliorate the matériel situation to an unknown extent. From the outset of a war, Yugoslavia would be short in certain categories of matériel, including tanks.

5. Yugoslavia cannot maintain her Armed Forces logistically for any extended period of time in war.

6. The terrain of Yugoslavia, except for the northeast part of the country, greatly favors the defenders. The Yugoslav General Staff

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has traditionally held ^{that} lying in the plains area about Novi Sad and Belgrade are indefensible, unless the Timisoara area of Rumania and that portion of Bulgaria north of Sofia are in Yugoslav hands. Consequently, it is not likely that the Belgrade area will be heavily contested against a strong concerted attack. In the face of a heavy attack, it can be expected that the Yugoslav Army will fight initial delaying actions and will fall back to previously selected defensive terrain in the mountainous areas of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, and Montenegro.

7. The tank strength of the Army is estimated at 400 of which 300 are T-34's. The Yugoslav Army has a probable D-Day total of nearly 400,000 troops. By D + 30, these could total 600,000 organized into approximately 45 divisions, of which 12 would be poorly equipped. While the fighting efficiency of the Yugoslav Army is high, there is a lack of spare parts, repair and maintenance facilities, and certain categories of essential materiel. For defensive operations in the mountains, the Army is well-led and well-trained, and would stubbornly resist any invasion by the Soviet Bloc. The Yugoslav Air Force, totalling approximately 700 aircraft, of which 350 are in 13 tactical regiments, is far more effective than the air forces of the neighboring Satellites, but would suffer in combat operation from a lack of spare parts. The Yugoslav Navy, which consists mainly of patrol boats and mine craft, five coastal destroyers, and 4 submarines, has very limited capabilities.

8. The arms and equipment of the Yugoslav forces are mainly of Soviet or German origin. Although there is inadequate information about the quantity and condition of Yugoslav equipment and the availability of reserve stocks, there is general agreement that the current supply would be inadequate to meet any heavy and sustained attack. [Estimated

lists of the minimum materiel now in the hands of the Yugoslav Army, Navy, and Air Forces are set forth in Annexes A, B, and C of Appendix

A.

[could be followed by A 5 of conclusion]

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B. Ability to withstand Satellite attack

1. Any Satellite attack upon Yugoslavia will be directed by the U.S.S.R. The motive for a Satellite attack on Yugoslavia probably would be disguised as a defensive war against a purported Yugoslav invasion. This motive for an attack would be difficult to impute to Poland and Czechoslovakia, owing to the remoteness of their frontiers from Yugoslavia. Because of the military inferiority of any one Satellite compared to Yugoslavia, any attack would be launched by a combination of at least two (Bulgaria, and Hungary or Rumania), probably three (Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary), and possibly all four of the Soviet-dominated States bordering on Yugoslavia.
2. Owing to the logistical difficulty of supporting an attack on Yugoslavia and because of their present military weaknesses, it is unlikely that Poland and Czechoslovakia would participate initially in a Satellite attack on Yugoslavia with their Armed Forces. Because of the geographical location of these countries, they probably would be involved in Soviet moves against the West, rather than towards the Balkans. Contributing to the relative weakness of the armies of Poland and Czechoslovakia is their preoccupation in maintaining internal security and the security of the east-west LOCs transversing their countries. However, they would go to the assistance of the other Satellites in an attack on Yugoslavia if so directed by the U.S.S.R. Moreover, mutual defense commitments

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with the other Satellite States might eventually force Poland and Czechoslovakia into a war against Yugoslavia. Czechoslovak supply of materiel to Hungary and Rumania is a probability.

3. Hungarian military participation in an attack on Yugoslavia would be both reluctant and relatively ineffective because of her present military weakness and fear of Yugoslav counter-action.

4. Because of Albania's inability to contribute effective military aid to an attack on Yugoslavia, and because an attack by Albania on Yugoslavia would bring about a retaliatory invasion by Yugoslavia, Albania might attempt to remain neutral.

5. Despite the foregoing limiting factors and because of the domination of these countries by the Soviets it is estimated that four of the Satellite States (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania) would engage in an ^{open military attack} ~~aggressive war~~ against Yugoslavia, at least in the opening stages.

6. It is believed that the Soviets and their puppets would make every attempt to launch a surprise attack. However, Yugoslavia, through covert means, probably would have some warning of the imminence of attack, and would, therefore, be in a state of readiness and would be at least partly mobilized, even though the exact magnitude, time, and direction of the attack might be unknown to the Yugoslavs.

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7. Strengths of Ground Forces

a. Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania:

(1) Estimated strength on D-Day (if before 1 Jan 1951)

| | <u>Albania</u> | <u>Bulgaria</u> | <u>Rumania</u> | <u>Hungary</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|------------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------------------------|
| Personnel | 70,000 | 200,000 | 300,000 | 80,000 | 650,000 |
| Units | 4 | 11 | 7 | 2 | 34 Inf Divs |
| | | 1 | 1 | | 2 Armd Divs |
| | | | 1 | 1 | 2 Mech Divs |
| | | | 3 | | 3 Other Divs |
| | | 5 | 4 | | 9 Combat Brigades incl 3 Armd |
| Tanks | 30 | 450 | 200 | 150 | 830 T-34s Few JS-3s |
| Soviet Mission | 500 | 2,000 | Unknown | Unknown | More than 2,500 |
| Soviet Divisions | | | 2 mech | 2 mech | 4 mech |

(2) Possible strength on D-Day (if before 1 Jan 51)*

| | <u>Albania</u> | <u>Bulgaria</u> | <u>Rumania</u> | <u>Hungary</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|-----------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Personnel | 100,000 | 250,000 | 300,000 | 100,000 | 750,000 |
| Units | 4 | 14 | 14 | 3 | 35 Inf Div |
| | | 3 | 1 | | 4 Armd Div |
| | | | 1 | 1 | 2 Mech Div |
| | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 12 Combat Brig |
| Tanks | 40 | 500 | 400 | 350 | 1290 T-34s |
| | | 10 | 50 | 40 | 100 JS-3s |

(3) Mobilization potential:

D / 30 845,000
46 divisions

D / 180 1,320,000
73 divisions

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*This is believed to be the maximum feasible military strength of the forces of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania under the circumstances considered. This strength estimate assumes the presence of necessary equipment from Soviet divisions in Hungary and Rumania to Satellite forces, and also that Satellite forces have received training during recent months with these Soviet units.

(4) There are now two Soviet mechanized divisions in Hungary and two in Rumania. It is possible that cadres of Hungarian and Rumanian units are, and have trained with these Soviet divisions, and that on D-Day the necessary tanks and equipment from these Soviet divisions would be with the attacking Satellite forces.

b. Strength of Yugoslav Ground Forces.

(1) Probable strength on D-Day (if before 1 Jan 1951)

| | |
|-------|--|
| Army | 400,000 |
| Units | 31 infantry divisions |
| | 2 armored divisions |
| | 34 independent regiments, including 5 armored |
| Tanks | 300-T-34s |
| | 100 miscellaneous |

(2) Mobilization potential:

| | |
|---------|--------------|
| D / 30 | 600,000 |
| | 45 divisions |
| D / 180 | 1,000,000 |
| | 60 divisions |

8. The naval forces of the Satellites and of Yugoslavia are extremely limited, and their employment would have a negligible effect

on the courses of action in a war between the Satellites and Yugoslavia.

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9. The combined air forces of the Satellite States and that of Yugoslavia are about equally balanced. The effectiveness of the air forces in a conflict between the Satellites and Yugoslavia would be a minor factor in a comparison of the relative combat capabilities of the two opposing forces.

10. The Communist Satellite military forces would undoubtedly be indoctrinated by vigorous communist propaganda that they are fighting a just war either to repel an alleged Yugoslav invasion or to liberate the Yugoslav people from the heretical Tito rule. This indoctrination, coupled with firm discipline within the Satellite armies, would insure that the Satellite troops would fight well so long as they were substantially successful in the war. Upon meeting determined and successful resistance by the Yugoslavs to their attacks, the willingness of the individual soldier to fight could be expected to decline sharply.

11. The obvious slogan of the Yugoslav Army probably would be "resist the invader." In resisting attacks on their homeland, the Yugoslav troops could be expected to fight with determination.

12. Most of the experienced combat leaders within the armies of the Communist Satellites have been purged since VE-day. Replacements for the purged officers have been selected primarily on the basis of political reliability. Nevertheless, substantial numbers of officers from these countries have had combat experience and have received training either

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in military schools in the U.S.S.R., by actually serving in Soviet Army units, or under Soviet military missions in their home countries following VE-day. Soviet "advisers" attached to tactical units would counterbalance the deficiencies in experienced leadership and these advisers probably would be the de facto commanders of many of the attacking units in the field.

13. The Satellites' main courses of action in attacking Yugoslavia probably would consist of the following:

(1) From Hungary

- (a) Area from which mounted: Szeged-Baja
- (b) Nature of attack: A direct attack, by heavy armor, supported by infantry.
- (c) Direction of attack: Szeged and Baja - Novi Sad-Belgrade.
- (d) Objective: Seizure of Belgrade.

(2) From Rumania

- (a) Area from which mounted: Timisoara
- (b) Nature of attack: A two-pronged, converging attack by heavy armor, supported by infantry.
- (c) Directions of attack: Timisoara - Zrenjanin-Belgrade, and Timisoara - Vrsac - Belgrade.
- (d) Objective: To converge on and seize Belgrade.

(3) From Bulgaria

- (a) Area from which mounted: Sofia
- (b) Nature of attack: A direct attack by heavy armor, supported by infantry

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(e) Direction of attack: Sofia - Nis - Belgrade

(d) Objective: To overrun the Morava Valley and to take Belgrade.

(4) After Belgrade is captured, the Satellite Armies objective would be to destroy the Yugoslav Army and to gain control of Yugoslavia.

14. Probable Additional Courses of Action

- (1) Bulgaria could launch a heavy attack from the Struma Valley area towards both Skoplje and the Albanian border, and towards Prilep-Ohrid and the Albanian border. This attack would be aimed at severing most of Yugoslav Macedonia from the rest of the country and at establishing a land corridor to Albania
- (2) An attack from the Nagykanizsa area in Hungary could be launched in the direction of Zagreb with the objective either of driving on to the Adriatic in the vicinity of Rijeka (Fiume), or of driving down the Sava River Valley.

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13. ~~The~~ ^{defensive} Yugoslav capabilities would vary in accordance with the strength of the attacking Satellite Armies. If Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary attack with the ^{approximate number of} ~~forces they probably would have~~, ^{now} ~~within the next six weeks~~ the Yugoslavs could be expected to oppose the invading forces on the frontier at each point of ingress and to withdraw, only under heavy pressure, to successive delaying and defensive positions. Much of the northeastern portion of the country, not including Belgrade, would be lost in the early weeks of a major war.

14. Elsewhere, Tito's withdrawals probably would be limited, dictated by the desirability of using the best terrain. Initial penetrations, other than the main blows in the northeastern direction at Belgrade, would be contained and soon reduced. Prompt Yugoslav counterdrives into Bulgaria and Hungary would be attempted and, in some places, these would be successful. Albania would be invaded and eventually decisively defeated. However, in order for the Yugoslav Army to defeat the invaders, it would be necessary that sufficient quantities of material be supplied promptly by the West.

15. Should the Satellite States attack with the maximum feasible force, the following Yugoslav actions and capabilities would apply:

Yugoslavia would fight along her frontiers at each point of invasion and would withdraw only under heavy pressure. The northeastern

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portion of Yugoslavia, probably including Belgrade, would be overrun. Deep penetrations toward Rijeka (Fiume) and Skopje would be made by the Satellites, but they would ultimately be contained and reduced. Counter-drives by Yugoslavia would be attempted against Bulgaria and Hungary; these would meet with varying degrees of limited success, but would cause the Bulgarians and Hungarians considerable initial difficulty to contain. The Yugoslav Army would invade and defeat Albania. The Satellite attack would force the Yugoslav Army to withdraw to preselected positions and to take up a defensive line in the mountain areas of western Yugoslavia. If logistically supported by the USSR, the Satellites could successfully invade Yugoslavia, unless she were given substantial material assistance. Without such aid, Yugoslav forces might eventually be forced to withdraw to mountainous terrain and to become a guerrilla force.

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C. Ability to withstand Soviet-Satellite attack.

1. The Soviets have the capability of deploying 25 to 30 well-equipped divisions with adequate logistical support against Yugoslavia without unduly weakening their over-all strategic position. Six of these divisions are already in Austria, Hungary, and Rumania. Owing to logistical problems imposed by the Yugoslav terrain, it is probable that no more than 20 to 25 Soviet divisions would be employed. The Soviets also have the capability without unduly weakening their over-all position, of employing sufficient numbers of aircraft completely to dominate the air ~~situation, including neutralization~~ of the major Yugoslav ports. Between 1,200 and 1,500 Soviet aircraft are now located in Austria, Hungary, Rumania, and the Odessa Military District. The Soviet Black Sea Fleet possesses the capability of putting superior forces into operation against the Yugoslav Navy in the Adriatic. However, this employment of Soviet naval units would require passage of the Turkish Straits prior to the outbreak of hostilities and, upon commencement of hostilities, would result in these units operating with no practical access to bases. Such a course of action is improbable.

2. Yugoslavia's Satellite neighbors - Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Albania - together have a total of 31 divisions of varying effectiveness. Their tank strength is estimated at about 800 T-34's. Of these

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Satellites, the Bulgarian Army, with its approximately 450 T-34 tanks, has reached a far higher state of readiness for combat than the others. By D + 30, the strength of these four armies could be increased from a D-day total of 650,000 to 845,000, organized into 40-50 divisions. The Soviets would supply necessary equipment and, throughout the operation, would provide logistic support and operational "advice". The Satellite Air Forces, as presently equipped with 745 World War II aircraft, are at a low level of effectiveness. The Satellite navies are negligible or nonexistent.

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(probably in conjunction with Yugoslav's Satellite neighbors)
 2. Against an all-out Soviet attack, Yugoslavia would have no hope of holding the plains, and her only chance of prolonged resistance would lie in establishing a defensive line in the mountains to the southwest. Any attempt to hold Belgrade or the plains, however desirable politically, might well be fatal. Fortunately, present indications are that Tito will adopt the strategy of withdrawing to a defensive line in the mountains. Continued organized resistance in this mountain area for more than two months would require major and prompt materiel assistance from the outside. When, and if, organized resistance is overcome by the Soviets, the Yugoslavs could be depended upon to maintain effective guerrilla operations. The extent of these operations would be dependant upon the quantity of materiel assistance from the outside.

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